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Abstract 
 
Calamities such as extreme droughts and infrastructure breakdowns potentially hamper the 
continuity of food companies, as well as the continuity of food supply at the level of Europe as a 
whole. Results from an expert elicitation in the Netherlands show that part of senior management 
is confident to be able to deal with such calamities. The overall picture however looks different 
as for instance only 30% has top-3 calamities incorporated in business continuity plans. Also, the 
majority sees some need for a Deltaplan, with a main role for the EU-government. Findings are 
useful in designing public-private partnerships for food supply resilience in Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Calamities such as extreme droughts, infrastructure breakdowns and pandemics potentially 
disrupt food companies’ continuity, and, as a consequence, the continuity of food supply 
throughout Europe. Although food supply has shown to be rather robust during previous crises 
such as the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, various severe livestock epidemics, and 2003 droughts 
(Bindraban et al., 2008), there is increasing concern about food supply chains’ resilience. For 
instance, Peck (2006) concluded that UK food companies are not well prepared for system-wide 
disruptions, such as loss of power and loss of water. Similarly, DEFRA (2009) stated that the UK 
food system has the potential to be significantly vulnerable to interruptions in energy supplies. 
Subuh et al. (2008) found that feed and food companies lack adequate strategies for responding 
to food terrorism. In addition, Aerts et al. (2008) presented scenarios of abrupt climate change, 
such as “a little ice age” and “a nuclear winter”, potentially leading to food chain disruptions and 
famines. Also, in 2008, following the report from Bindraban et al. (2008), the Steering 
Committee Technology Assessment of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, 
The Netherlands, stated that EU food supply is rather robust, but that insufficient knowledge 
exists on food supply continuity if multiple disastrous scenarios occur in a short period of time or 
if scenarios occur that did not happen before in recent history.  
 Literature on the impact of calamities addresses either the continuity at the company level, 
or the continuity of food supply at the aggregate level of e.g. Europe as a whole. Moreover, 
company level studies generally focus on risk management and business continuity management, 
not on the perceived impact itself. At the aggregate level, impact analyses are qualitative, such as 
in Aerts et al. (2008), or carried out for the food system as a whole. An example of the latter is 
the report by Bindraban et al. (2008), who map the necessary changes of Europe’s food system to 
respond to a complete stop of soy imports from America. In addition, none of these studies links 
 2
company level continuity with food supply continuity at the aggregate level. In this context, the 
objectives of this paper are (i) to analyse the perceived impact of various calamities on continuity 
at the company level as well as on food supply continuity in Europe as a whole; and (ii) to 
analyse the perceived relevance of risk management strategies to deal with such calamities. 
Results are obtained through expert elicitation. Experts are from feed and food companies 
operating in the Netherlands (and elsewhere) as well as from other organisations such as 
governments, research and sector organisations. 
 
2. Calamities in food supply chains 
 
Reviewing the literature on calamities in food supply chains yields a long-list of potential 
calamities and related risk management strategies. These are summarised in Table 1. Calamities 
range from food terrorism and infrastructure breakdowns to extreme weather events and 
economic crises. Also, the list of suggested risk management strategies is very diverse. Some 
risk management strategies are pro-active, such as stock holding, implementation of business 
continuity management (BCM) principles, focusing on local facilities and lifestyle, increasing 
energy efficiency and increasing global production in a sustainable way. Other strategies are 
more reactive, such as temporary waivers on regulations and culling of diseased livestock. Also, 
some risk management strategies are in the public domain while others are purely private. 
Examples of the latter can be found in BCM and information sharing practices. There is also a 
number of public-private partnership strategies, such as implementing surveillance systems, 
keeping larger stocks, effective crises management, and introduction of resilient crops and 
techniques.  
[TABLE 1] 
 With regard to the perceived relevance and implementation of a number of the risk 
management strategies mentioned, company level expert studies by Peck (2006) and Subuh et al. 
(2008) revealed among others that crisis management is in practise more based on reactive 
actions than on proactive risk management. Also, BCM is found to be (partially) implemented, 
but is generally seen as a mechanism to protect the well-being of customers and shareholders, not 
as a tool for the public good or to maintain operations in times of national emergency. With 
regard to control actions in case of bio-terrorism, analyses showed that many control actions are 
undertaken but that the majority of food safety managers mistakenly interprets HACCP-based 
systems to be adequate for dealing with food terrorism. Also, food companies perceive their own 
security performance as better than that of their suppliers and the chain as whole. About stock 
holding, Peck concludes that “in a perfect world it is to be recommended that [..] redundant 
capacity and capability should be held by all organizations, just in case. In the present business 
climate however, this may not be a realistic proposition […]”. These findings illustrate that 
analysing risk perception and risk management of calamities in food supply chains is not 
unambiguous, neither at the company level nor at the aggregate level.  
  
3. Materials and methods 
 
Survey design 
The survey consists of two main blocks, the first dealing with the perceived impact of calamities 
and the second focusing on the perceived relevance of risk management strategies. The first part 
started by asking for the interpretation of “continuity”. Two options were given, i.e. (i) 
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continuously providing a wide variety of products (business as usual), and (ii) continuously 
fulfilling consumers’ minimum nutritional needs (possibly with less products on the shelf). Next, 
given a respondent’s interpretation of continuity, the perceived threat of 11 calamities (see next 
paragraph) on food supply continuity in Europe was evaluated on Likert-scales from 1 (not 
threatened at all) to 5 (very much threatened). After that, respondents were asked to indicate their 
top-3 calamities threatening continuity at the food company level.  
 Calamities in the questionnaire are based on the long-list presented in Table 1, fine-tuned 
to potential Dutch circumstances. Some of the calamities are related to climate, such as “extreme 
drought in EU”, “extreme drought in EU and high oil prices”, “low stocks and extreme drought 
in EU”, and “extreme cold in Western-EU”. The other calamities focus on the availability of key 
inputs (“lengthy loss of key suppliers”, “complete stop of soy imports from America”), labour 
(“pandemic affecting all employees”), electricity (“lengthy or structural unavailability of 
electricity”) and transport facilities (“lengthy unavailability of river Rhine for inland shipping”, 
“lengthy crisis of road transport in EU”, and “lengthy unavailability of Rotterdam harbour”). 
Two of the climate-related calamities are situations in which multiple disastrous scenarios occur 
in a short period of time. All in all, none of the calamities exactly happened in the Netherlands in 
the recent past, although some are connected to potential threats that received a lot of media 
attention.  For instance, loss of key suppliers and stop of soy imports relates to debates on non-
allowed genetically modified substances and potential impacts for imports. A road transport 
crisis links to various road blockades in France in the past, which sometimes lasted 2 to 3 days. 
Problems with regard to electricity and oil link to 2008 problems with Russian gas transports and 
peaks in international oil prices. The pandemic scenario associates with global H5N1 (“bird flu”) 
and Influenza H1N1 (“Mexican or swine flu”) concerns in 2006 and 2009 respectively. Lastly, 
the stock issue connects to 2007 concerns about historically low stocks in the EU in combination 
with high prices on the world market. Three calamities, i.e. extreme cold, non-availability of the 
Rhine, and non-availability of the Rotterdam harbour, have no such linkages. Underlying causes 
are specified for some calamities, such as with regard to drought and cold, but not for all. For 
instance, the unavailability of Rotterdam harbour could be due to extreme weather but also due 
to terrorist bombing.  
 In the risk management part, respondents were first asked to indicate which of the top-3 
calamities had already been incorporated in business continuity planning (not, not yet, partly, 
fully). Next, the perceived relevance of in total 16 risk management strategies for dealing with 
calamities at the company level (next paragraph) were scored on a scale from 1 (not relevant at 
all) to 5 (very relevant). Then the need for a so-called Deltaplan dealing with food supply 
continuity at the level of Europe as a whole was addressed, including the party(ies) responsible 
and the top-3 of potential risk management strategies in a Deltaplan.  
 Risk management strategies in the questionnaire are derived from risk management and 
BCM literature from among others Hardaker et al. (2004) and Peck (2006) respectively. Most 
measures are at company level, i.e. “larger raw materials stock”, “larger final goods stock”, “own 
fuel supplies”, “company energy generation”, “additional financial reserves”, “scaling down”, 
“scaling up”, “spatial diversification”, “redundant capacity”, “process/product modification” and 
“flexibility of technology”. Five strategies cover risk management tools that need to be taken up 
together with other stages of the supply chain, i.e. “broad sourcing/open chains”, “closed chains”, 
“horizontal alliances”, “alliances with suppliers” and “local suppliers and customers”.  
 Besides the predefined lists of calamities and risk management strategies, respondents 
were also able to indicate “other” calamities and strategies perceived to be relevant. In the third 
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block of the questionnaire companies were characterised with regard to stage (supplier, primary 
producer, processor, wholesaler), type of chain (meat, plant) and turnover. Also, we asked 
respondents’ willingness to be involved in possible follow-up research. The questionnaire was 
pretested by 2 experts, one from university and one from an accredited certification institute 
dealing with the whole supply chain. Questionnaires were sent by email. Email was also used to 
follow-up on non-response. 
 
Sample  
In September 2009, the survey was sent to senior management and staff of 20 food companies 
and 20 other organisations, including government, research and sector organisations1. Companies 
were chosen in such a way that ideally all stages of meat and plant chains would be covered. 
After 3 months 30 surveys were returned, mostly by email, some by mail or fax, implying a 
response rate of 75%. As illustrated in Table 2, 16 respondents were from food companies and 
14 from other organisations. They turned out to be indeed from senior management and high-
level staff.  
[TABLE 2] 
 Within the category of food companies, there are 3 animal feed companies, 1 large-scale 
primary producer, 3 processors, 4 wholesalers and 5 companies covering multiple stages of the 
chain. The primary producer, animal feed companies and processors are regarded as production 
companies. Also, 2 of the 5 companies covering multiple stages of the chain are regarded as 
production companies as they do not have any wholesale activities. Food companies’ turnover is 
between Euro 1 million and Euro 1 billion (n=4), Euro 1-10 billion (n=7) and above Euro 10 
billion (n=1).  
 Respondents showed high commitment for participating in follow-up research as all but 
one answered positively to this question. Also, a relatively large number of respondents, i.e. one-
third (6 food companies, 4 other organisations), took the opportunity to indicate other calamities 
and risk management strategies than the predefined ones, as summarised in Appendix 1. Reasons 
for non-response are not certain and may range from time constraints to potential (shareholder) 
sensitivity of the topic under consideration. 
 
Follow-up interviews 
To gain deeper insights into the answers provided, we did 3 follow-up interviews: 2 with food 
companies and 1 with a research organisation. These were selected based on their different views 
expressed, i.e. a relatively low perceived impact of calamities, a relatively high perceived impact 
of calamities, and a full incorporation of top-3 calamities in business continuity planning. 
 
4. Results  
 
Interpretation of food supply continuity 
About half of the food companies considers food supply continuity as “business as usual” (53%); 
the other 47% of the food companies views it as “fulfilling minimum nutritional needs, possibly 
                                                 
1 Surveys sent to other organisations differed somewhat from the version described, i.e. (i) top-3 calamities were 
framed more generally towards “threatening the continuity of food companies operating in the Netherlands”, (ii) we 
did not ask to what degree top-3 calamities are covered in business continuity planning, and (iii) also the relevance 
of risk management strategies was framed more generally towards food companies in the Netherlands. Both versions 
of the questionnaire are available on request.  
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with less products on the shelf”. Other organisations all regard food supply continuity as 
fulfilling minimum needs. In answering the question, many respondents made links with 
sustainability. For instance, business as usual in the future was stated to still behold ample choice 
and availability of products, but with a different package of more sustainable products. Similarly, 
in the future less products on the shelf may mean not only literally less products, but also very 
different, i.e. more sustainable, products. Interestingly, the 47% of food companies adhering this 
view apparently trust that they themselves are still able to stay in business. 
 
Perceived impact of calamities 
From the various predefined calamities the unavailability of electricity, a lengthy road crisis and 
low stocks in combination with a drought are perceived to be the most threatening for food 
supply continuity in Europe (Table 3). Also, other risks (open question) scored relatively high 
(ranked 2nd), especially for food companies. These other risks, as listed in Appendix 1, are 
mostly in the field of production risks such as unavailability of drinking water, food and water 
contamination from terrorism, extreme droughts on multiple continents and dependence on fossil 
fuels including related power of the Middle-East. Also policy issues were mentioned quit 
frequently, such as with regard to distorting legislation in the field of bio-energy, and (as 
mentioned during one of the follow-up interviews) governments adhering to status quo situations 
in a forced way. Also monopolistic behaviour and the risk of much higher prices, potentially 
leading to food wars, were mentioned as potential calamities threatening food supply continuity 
in Europe.  
[TABLE 3] 
 Calamities perceived on average to be not very threatening for continuity in Europe relate 
to the unavailability of the river Rhine (ranked lowest), extreme cold in the West of Europe, 
extreme droughts throughout Europe, and a complete stop of soy imports from America. This is 
quit similar for food companies and other organisations, although food companies perceived the 
unavailability of the river Rhine as even less threatening than other organisations did. The 
relatively low perceived importance of a complete stop of soy imports from America is in line 
with findings from Bindraban et al. (2008), who concluded that a sudden stop of soy imports into 
the EU would not threaten the fulfilment of EU consumers’ minimum dietary needs. The 
relatively low ranking of pandemics seems to be in line with a comment made during one of the 
follow-up interviews in which it was indicated that recent attention for Mexican flu and “bird 
flu”, including government incentives to design business continuity plans in case of such 
pandemics, has already triggered food companies to manage this risk. The relatively low 
perceived threat from a lengthy unavailability of the Rotterdam harbour likely relates to the 
presumption that other harbours, such as Antwerp and Le Havre, stay accessible. This 
presumption was mentioned a few times. Detailed scores (not in Table 3) show that respondents 
generally were not very pronounced with regard to their perceptions, i.e. relatively few scored 
“1” (not threatening at all) and “5” (very much threatening).  
 For company level continuity, Table 4 shows that calamities perceived to be important are 
different from those at the aggregate level. For food companies, besides unavailability of 
electricity and a lengthy crisis of road transport, important calamities now also include a lengthy 
loss of key suppliers and a complete stop of soy imports from America. Other organisations now 
also perceive a lengthy unavailability of the Rotterdam harbour as an important risk. Apparently, 
these “new calamities” are regarded as threatening for the continuity at company level, but 
without substantial distorting effects for food supply at the aggregate level.  
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 Within the group of food companies, different perceptions were found for among others 
companies with fresh produce which are heavily depending on import and export versus 
companies with processed food who are operating on global markets. The first, as shown in 
follow-up interviews, perceive calamities as much more risky than the second, who heavily trust 
that sustainable goods and sustainable relationships also “keep the door open” in case of 
calamities. Differences were also found between production companies and wholesalers; 
production companies seem to worry more about the risk of calamities than wholesalers. For 
instance, at the aggregate level production companies perceive extreme droughts in combination 
with high oil prices, and a lengthy loss of key suppliers as significantly more threatening than 
wholesalers (P≤0.05). Also, production companies mentioned other risks than the predefined 
ones, while wholesalers did not. In addition, in the top-3 assessment of calamities threatening 
company level continuity, production companies put more attention to the drought calamities 
than wholesalers did. In addition, differences were found for food companies perceiving 
continuity as “business as usual” versus those having the “minimum view”. Business as usual is 
apparently more at risk in case of “other risks” and calamities such as low stocks and droughts 
(P≤0.05). All in all, however, correlations between calamities perceived to be relatively most 
threatening, such as low stocks and droughts, a road transport crisis and non-availability of 
electricity, were significantly positive (P≤0.05), suggesting that food companies in general agree 
on the level of threat of these type of calamities.  
[TABLE 4] 
 
Perceived relevance of risk management strategies 
Before going into the longlist of risk management strategies, we first look to the business 
continuity planning activities with regard to the top-3 calamities threatening continuity at the 
company level, i.e. unavailability of electricity, loss of key suppliers, stop of soy imports and a 
crisis of road transport (Table 4). Table 4 shows that less than half of the food companies has 
fully incorporated these risks in business continuity planning. For instance, the risk of a lengthy 
road transport crisis in the EU is stated to be fully incorporated in BCM by 20%, while 40% has 
not incorporated it at all. Moreover, for 2 calamities perceived to be threatening at the aggregate 
level, i.e. “other calamities” and low stocks in combination with an extreme drought in the EU, 
even none of the food companies indicated to have these fully incorporated in business 
continuity planning. In addition, 2 food companies, after having indicated the top-3, did not 
answer the BCM question at all. As revealed during the follow-up interview, the reason for one 
of these companies being that alternative solutions are hardly available or only at very high costs. 
This was actually reinforced by the other food company interview, in which it was stated that 
risk analyses and related business continuity planning are only undertaken for known hazards for 
which feasible solutions are available. Moreover, during these interviews it was expressed that 
BCM is mainly undertaken for economic reasons, not for reasons of social responsibility. Even 
when triggered by governments, aspects such as level playing field are perceived to be very 
important.  
 Specific risk management strategies perceived to be relevant to enhance company level 
continuity are mainly in the area of solving risks together with other stages of the supply chain, 
such as in broad sourcing and alliances with suppliers (Table 5). The latter is especially true for 
food companies. Also, company level energy generation is perceived to be relevant. In fact, 
highest importance was given to “other strategies” (Appendix 1). While predefined strategies 
addressed actions at company level, open answers focused on public and public-private risk 
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management strategies. Suggested strategies in the public domain are among others an increased 
role of FAO and WHO in crisis management, meetings comparable to top meetings in the 
financial world (e.g. between the European Bank and the US Federal Bank), and a check on 
whether current global food organisations are adequate for dealing with potential future 
calamities. At the public-private partnership level, there is mainly a call for increasing 
sustainability, among others by reducing spoilage and by triggering dietary changes. Also, 
attention is paid to assure transport and electricity facilities and to prevent livestock epidemics. 
At the private level, suggested strategies include improved issue management, logistical 
solutions, chain flexibility and valorisation of by-products.  
[TABLE 5] 
 Withy regard to strategies perceived not to be relevant, Table 5 shows that these can be 
found in the area of costly measures such as larger final goods stocks, own fuel supplies, scaling 
down production and investing in redundant capacity. Interestingly, the latter is listed twice in 
Appendix 1 as being a useful risk management strategy, i.e. once as “provision of latent capacity 
at farm and processing level” and once as “emergency plan to allow farming everywhere 
possible setting aside nature plans and environmental requirements”. All in all, continuity of 
food companies in case of calamities is perceived to benefit more from alliances, open chains, 
flexibility, alternative sourcing and spatial diversification as compared to scaling down, focusing 
on local suppliers and setting up closed chains. With regard to flexibility, this is even more true 
for production companies than for wholesalers (Table 5). Also, the high perceived relevance of 
alliances with suppliers is especially true for food companies who perceive continuity as 
business as usual (P≤0.05, not in Table 5). The relatively high variation of the perceived 
relevance of risk management strategies, as illustrated by relatively high stand deviations in 
Table 5, likely relates to the diversity of calamities included, each requiring a different type of 
risk management solution. For instance, a significant positive correlation was found for food 
companies’ perceptions on the importance of a lengthy loss of key suppliers and the relevance of 
additional financial reserves, scaling up and spatial diversification (P≤0.05). Part of the variation 
may however also reflect opposing views, such as with regard to the relevance of redundant 
capacity, as mentioned above.  
 
Perceived need for a Deltaplan 
To adequately manage calamities, one-third sees a need for a Deltaplan (Table 6), one-third sees 
a potential need for such a plan, and about one-third sees no need for it at all. Still, from the latter 
group, 4 respondents shared ideas on parties responsible (but, apparently, without entitling their 
involvement as a Deltaplan). Food companies are mostly in the first group, i.e. seeing a need for 
a Deltaplan, while other organisations are mostly in the “possibly group”. Also, the first group 
entails more companies regarding continuity as business as usual, while those with the 
“minimum view” are more in the second. From the group completely disliking the idea of 
Deltaplan including the idea of any other party being responsible for food supply continuity 
except the food companies themselves (n=5), 4 are food companies. These companies all scored 
relatively low on the perceived threat of calamities. 
[TABLE 6] 
 The party considered to be most responsible for a Deltaplan is the EU-government, 
mentioned by 53% of respondents. Still, the majority (i.e. 13 out of 25 respondents, see footnote 
1 under Table 6) regards a Deltaplan as a multiple-party responsibility. The relatively large role 
for governments coincides with the suggested public and public-private risk management 
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strategies discussed before (Appendix 1). Strategies perceived to be important in a Deltaplan are 
larger raw materials stock, additional financial reserves, broad sourcing and horizontal alliances. 
They clearly differ from the strategies perceived to be important at the company level. 
Differentiating strategies to parties perceived to be responsible, shows that in case NL-
governments are perceived to be responsible, scaling up is relatively important, while for EU-
governments this is larger raw materials stock. For food companies it is suggested to focus on 
alliances with suppliers.  
 
5. Conclusions, discussion and further research  
 
In this study we analysed the perception of food companies and other organisations with regard 
to the threat of calamities for the continuity of food companies, as well as for the continuity of 
food supply at the aggregate level of Europe as a whole. High response rates and large 
commitment for follow-up studies illustrate senior management’s interest into this topic. The 
following conclusions can be drawn: 
(1) Calamities perceived to be relatively threatening for food supply continuity in Europe are 
unavailability of electricity, a lengthy crisis of road transport, and low stocks in combination 
with a drought. Continuity of individual companies is, next to unavailability of electricity and 
a lengthy crisis of road transport, perceived to be threatened most by a lengthy loss of key 
suppliers, unavailability of the Rotterdam harbour and a complete stop of soy imports from 
America. Most differences in perceptions are found within the group of food companies, i.e. 
production companies seem to worry more about calamities than wholesalers. Also, 
companies with fresh produce perceive calamities to be relatively more threatening than 
companies with processed food.  
(2) From the calamities perceived to be threatening continuity at company level, on average 30% 
is fully covered in companies’ business continuity planning. For calamities threatening food 
supply continuity in Europe this percentage is lower. With regard to risk management 
strategies perceived to be relevant for safeguarding continuity of companies strategies such 
as alliances, open chains, flexibility, alternative sourcing and spatial diversification score 
much higher than strategies in the field of scaling down, focusing on local suppliers and 
setting up closed chains. Besides, also public strategies such as improving international 
governance comparable to financial sectors are perceived as relevant. Also, the majority sees 
some need for a Deltaplan in which multiple stakeholders are involved but with a main 
responsibility for EU-government. Such a Deltaplan would involve strategies such as larger 
raw materials stock and additional financial reserves.  
(3) Overall, the study shows that part of senior management is confident to be able to deal with 
calamities such as described in this research. They thereby heavily trust on resilience of 
sustainable production systems, embedded in a policy environment consistently supporting 
sustainability. The average picture from the analyses however shows less confidence because 
of the relatively limited business continuity planning for major calamities. In addition, 
because even this seems to be an overestimation as business continuity planning and 
underlying risk analyses seem to focus on the known hazards for which economically 
feasible solutions exist.  
 
Discussion and further research 
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- System boundaries. Given a globalising world and the fact that Europe is a relatively rich part, 
does complicate the definition of the boundaries of “food supply in Europe”. For most 
calamities, borders are not fully closing down; it might “just” become more difficult or costly 
to transport goods to Europe. In this context, one could argue that “no matter what calamity 
will happen, food supply in Europe always goes on, as commodities and products can be 
bought elsewhere”. Although this might be true for some cases, it may not be ethical or 
feasible in other cases. Answers from respondents however show they generally rely on 
sustained flexibility and open trade. Further research would have to reveal to what extent 
these presumptions are realistic. 
- Interpretation of food supply continuity. Overall, 70% interprets “continuity” as fulfilling 
consumers’ minimum nutritional needs; only half of the food companies regards it as 
“business as usual”. In one of the follow-up interviews it was indicated that in botch cases 
however consumer demand is central. In this perspective, further research on consumers’ 
perceptions would be highly relevant, i.e. what is consumers’ (minimum) demand in terms of 
choice, availability, price and products at the time of a calamity. In addition, contingent 
valuation studies can reveal consumers’ willingness to pay for safeguarding food supply 
continuity. 
- Belief in disaster relief. Food supply continuity appears to be mostly perceived as a public-
private partnership issue. However, the high preferred participation of governments entails 
the potential risk of food companies relying too much on “disaster relief” in case of 
calamities. Further research should address the efficiency of potential risk management 
strategies including the role of governments. Governments should be involved in such a way 
that food companies still get proper incentives for adequate self risk management. Lessons 
learned from recent financial crises can be helpful in this respect.  
- Linking company and aggregate levels. Some of the calamities perceived to be among the 
most threatening for continuity at company level are identical to those at the aggregate level, 
i.e. the unavailability of electricity, and a lengthy crisis of road transport. Others are 
perceived to be threatening for the company level, but not for the aggregate level, or the other 
way around. But why is this so? Are knock-on effects from companies to the aggregate level 
non-existing? Dynamic chain models which are able to simulate the impact of calamities on 
continuity of chain stages, and ultimately, chains’ outputs would enhance the insight into 
company and chain level resilience. Combining various of such models, covering 
strategically important supply chains, enhances insight into the resilience of food supply at 
the level of Europe as a whole. In fact, in such models, all previous research steps are 
integrated, i.e. company’s flexibility, the chain’s ability to fulfil consumer demands, and the 
impact of public-private risk management strategies respectively. 
- Food supply governance. Findings from this study are largely in line with literature, i.e. food 
companies attempt to safeguard business continuity, but mostly from an economic 
perspective (not from a social responsibility point of view), keeping abundant capacity is not 
efficient, and, overall, BCM is only partially implemented. In addition, food companies and 
related organisations are not very pronounced with regard to the perceived potential impact 
of calamities, possibly reflecting uncertainty. Also, given the high attention for sustainability 
issues, there may be some misinterpretation between food security on the longer term versus 
food supply continuity in the short run. Furthermore, some of the open answers reveal a 
focus on company level issues, not on large-scale calamities. Further research should address 
to what extent the suggestions given in the field of international governance, crisis 
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management and crisis training can improve awareness and risk management of calamities, 
without doom-mongering. 
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Table 1: Potential calamities affecting food supply in Europe, potential impacts and proposed 
risk management strategies.  
Source Calamities Impact Risk management 
Manning et al. 
(2005) 
Food terrorism with foreign 
animal disease 
Economic disruption, 
consequential losses, loss of 
consumer confidence, possible 
impacts for human health 
Public-private strategies; 
Adequate resources; 
Preparedness plans and 
routine exercises; Surveillance 
systems 
Peck (2006) Large-scale disruptions, i.e. 
fuel shortages, loss of power, 
loss of water, and disruptions 
from sickness and infectious 
disease 
- Temporary waivers on 
regulations; Implementation 
of business continuity 
management; Adjusted 
distribution strategies and 
stock holdings/locations in 
advance of foreseeable 
disruptions; Protocols on 
range reduction between 
suppliers and customers 
Boin and 
McConnell 
(2007) 
Critical infrastructure 
breakdowns 
- Contingency planning; 
Promoting societal resilience1 
Bindraban et al. 
(2008) 
Various, but with focus on 
collapse of trade affecting EU 
soybean (meal) imports  
Decrease of meat availability 
in Europe, but no threat for 
food security. Serious effects 
for feed and meat industry  
Raising stock levels of 
soybean in Europe; 
Cultivating more protein-rich 
feed crops within Europe; 
Exploration of dual-purpose 
crops   
Aerts et al. 
(2008) 
Abrupt climate change2 Many, including food chain 
disruptions, famines, and 
infrastructure damage 
Some prevention possible; 
Migration south; Adjustments3 
Subuh et al. 
(2008) 
Food terrorism4 - Control actions; Information 
sharing practices; Actions 
enhancing robustness5 
DEFRA (2009) Energy supply disruptions, 
pandemic flu, extreme 
weather events and transport 
disruptions, disruptions to the 
domestic food chain, 
economic risks to the food 
industry 
- Increasing global production 
in a sustainable way; 
Improving trading and market 
conditions; Managing crises 
effectively; Working together 
Meuwissen et 
al. (2009) 
Livestock epidemics Direct costs, consequential 
losses 
Risk prevention; Protective 
vaccination; Culling 
1Among others: preparing first responders, business continuity planning, working with communities, and joint 
preparation and training.   
2Including “little ice age”, “nuclear Winter” and “volcanic Aerosol”.  
3Among others: focus on local facilities and lifestyle, port de-icing or relocation, increased energy efficiency, 
increased renewable energy, reliance on food trade with south, stockpiling of freshwater, introduction of resilient 
crops and techniques, alliance with neighbours for trade and security, and capability to adjust with wealth and health.  
4Not only from terrorists, but possibly also from supply chain partners with conflicting interests and dissatisfied 
employees. 
5More specifically “control actions” include aspects of process strategy, management and technology, infrastructure 
management, and security metrics. “Information sharing” relates to communication management, management 
technology, and relationship and public interface management. “Robustness” includes emergency plans and 
emergency budgets. 
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Table 2: Description of sample (n=30). 
 Number  Turnover (euro)1 
   <1 million > 1 mill. –  
< 1 billion 
> 1 billion –  
< 10 billion 
> 10 billion 
Food companies Total = 16      
- Feed companies 3  - 1 2 - 
- Primary producers 1  - 1 - - 
- Processors (plant and animal) 3  - 1 2 - 
- Companies covering multiple 
stages of the chain 
 
5 
  
- 
 
1 
 
3 
 
- 
- Wholesale 42  - - - 1 
Other organisations Total = 14      
- Government 4      
- Research 3      
- Sector 3      
- Other 4      
1Not all food companies disclosed turnover. 
2Including 2 respondents from 1 company. 
 
 
Table 3: Perceptions of impact of calamities on food supply continuity in Europe, overall and for 
various groups (mean scores)1,2.  
 Overall 
(n=30) 
 Role in food 
supply 
 Stage of chain3 
 Mean SD Rank  Food 
comp. 
(n=16) 
Other 
org. 
(n=14) 
 Prod. 
(n=10) 
Whole
-sale 
(n=3) 
Extreme drought in EU 2.8 0.81 9/10  2.8 2.8  2.7 2.3 
Extreme drought in EU and high oil prices 3.3 0.71 5  3.4 3.3  3.4** 3.0** 
Low stocks and extreme drought in EU 3.4 1.00 4  3.6 3.1  3.6 3.3 
Extreme cold in Western-EU4 2.7 0.77 11  2.6 2.8  2.5 3.3 
Lengthy unavail. of Rhine for inland shipping  2.0 0.93 12  1.8* 2.3*  2.0 1.7 
Complete stop of soy imports from America 2.8 1.29 9/10  3.1 2.6  3.2 3.3 
Lengthy crisis of road transport in EU  3.5 1.17 3  3.4 3.5  3.4 3.3 
Lengthy or structural non-avail. of electricity 4.2 0.79 1  4.2 4.3  4.3 4.0 
Pandemic affecting all employees  3.1 1.03 7  3.3 2.9  3.6 3.3 
Lengthy unavailability of Rotterdam harbour 2.9 1.01 8  2.9 3.0  3.1 1.7 
Lengthy loss of key suppliers due to crisis  3.2 1.19 6  3.2 3.2  3.3* 2.3* 
Other5 4.1 0.64 2  4.5* 3.8*  4.5 - 
1Measured on a scale from 1 (not threatened at all) to 5 (very much threatened). 
2Asterisks indicate significant differences at P≤0.05 (**) and P≤0.10 (*). 
3Food companies are grouped according to stage of chain: production companies (primary producers, feed 
companies and processors) and wholesalers. Companies covering multiple stages including wholesale are excluded 
(n=3). 
4Due to changing gulf stream. 
5Open question, see Appendix 1. 
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Table 4: Top-3 calamities perceived to threaten continuity of food companies and % in Business 
Continuity Management (BCM) plans. 
 % in top 3  % in BCM  
of food companies (n=13) 
 Food 
companies 
(n=15) 
Other 
organisations 
(n=14) 
 No Not 
yet 
Partly Yes 
Extreme drought in EU - -  - - - - 
Extreme drought in EU and high oil prices 7 5  0 0 100 0 
Low stocks and extreme drought in EU 5 5  0 0 100 0 
Extreme cold in Western-EU1 2 5  0 100 0 0 
Lengthy unavail. of Rhine for inland shipping  - 2  - - - - 
Complete stop of soy imports from America 12 5  0 25 50 25 
Lengthy crisis of road transport in EU  12 24  40 0 40 20 
Lengthy or structural non-avail. of electricity 27 31  10 10 50 30 
Pandemic affecting all employees  10 5  25 0 0 75 
Lengthy unavailability of Rotterdam harbour 2 10  0 0 0 100 
Lengthy loss of key suppliers due to crisis  15 7  20 20 20 40 
Other2 7 2  0 0 100 0 
Total  100 100      
Overall    14 11 46 30 
1Due to changing gulf stream. 
2Open question, see Appendix 1. 
 
Table 5: Perceived relevance of risk management strategies for business continuity, overall and 
for various groups (mean scores)1,2.  
 Overall  Role in food supply  Stage of chain 
 Mean SD Rank  Food 
comp. 
(n=16) 
Other 
org. 
(n=14) 
 Prod. 
(n=10) 
Whole-
sale3 
(n=3) 
Larger raw materials stock   3.4 1.30 5/6  3.3 3.6  3.7 3.7 
Larger final goods stock 2.6 1.18 14/15  2.6 2.6  2.7 4.0 
Own fuel supplies  2.6 1.24 14/15  2.4 2.8  2.2 2.5 
Company energy generation 3.5 1.15 2/3/4  3.3 3.6  2.9 3.5 
Additional financial reserves 3.2 1.33 9/10  3.6 2.9  3.7 2.5 
Broad sourcing / open chains 3.5 1.30 2/3/4  3.6 3.4  3.1 4.5 
Closed chains 2.7 1.20 13  2.7 2.6  2.9 2.0 
Horizontal alliances  3.2 1.23 9/10  3.2 3.1  3.1 3.5 
Alliances with suppliers 3.5 1.17 2/3/4  3.9* 3.1*  3.7 3.7 
Local suppliers and customers 2.8 1.18 11/12  2.9 2.7  2.7 2.5 
Scaling down 2.0 0.94 17  1.9 2.1  1.7 3.5 
Scaling up 2.8 1.28 11/12  3.3* 2.4*  3.1 3.0 
Spatial diversification 3.3 1.10 7/8  3.6 2.9  3.6 2.5 
Redundant capacity 2.3 0.86 16  2.5 2.2  2.4 2.5 
Process/product modification  3.3 1.23 7/8  3.4 3.3  3.3 3.5 
Flexibility of technology 3.4 1.15 5/6  3.2 3.6  3.4** 2.0** 
Other4 4.4 0.55 1  4.3 4.5  4.3 - 
1Measured on a scale from 1 (not relevant at all) to 5 (very relevant). 
2Asterisks indicate significant differences at P≤0.05 (**) and P≤0.10 (*). 
3Food companies are grouped according to stage of chain: production companies (primary producers, feed 
companies and processors) and wholesalers. Companies covering multiple stages including wholesale are excluded 
(n=3). 
4Open question, see Appendix 1. 
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Table 6: Perceived need for Deltaplan, party(ies) responsible and top-3 strategies for Deltaplan. 
 Total 
(n=30) 
 Responsible party(ies) (n=25)1 
 NL- 
government 
EU- 
government  
Sector 
organisations 
Food 
companies 
Yes 10 (33%)  3 (30%) 9 (90%) 2 (20%) 3 (30%) 
Possibly 11 (37%)  4 (36%) 8 (73%) 1 (9%) 3 (27%) 
No 92 (30%)  1 (11%) 3 (33%) 0 1 (11%) 
Overall (%)   8 (21%) 20 (53%) 3 (8%) 7 (18%) 
1Number of respondents indicating 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 party(ies) were 5, 12, 9, 3 and 1 respectively. 
2From whom 5 give no further indications on responsible party(ies).  
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Appendix 1: Categorisation of answers to open questions 
 
 Answers1  
Risks (n=10)  
Price risks - Much higher prices (leading to food wars) 
Production risks - Food and water contamination (due to diseases, pests, disasters, terrorism) 
 - ICT problems 
 - Livestock epidemics 
 - Unavailability of drinking water [2x] 
 - Extreme droughts on multiple continents 
 - Crisis at plant level 
 - Dependence on fossil fuels and power of Middle-East  
Institutional risks - Political issues 
 - Redundant legislation 
 - Distorting policy, e.g. with respect to bio-energy 
Other   - Economic environment 
 - Environmental issues  
 - Monopolistic and patent behaviour in food production 
Risk management (n=10)  
Private - Active issue management 
 - Research and development 
 - Invest in logistical solutions 
 - Provision of latent production capacity at farm and processing level 
 - Sourcing of alternative raw materials; Increasing chain flexibility 
 - Increased valorisation of by-products 
Public - Improved international governance 
 - Increased role of e.g. FAO and WHO in crisis management (comparable to top 
meetings in banking sector between European Bank and FED) [2x] 
 
- Need for a global Deltaplan including a check on whether current global 
organizations are adequate [2x] 
 - Risk and crisis training at policy level 
 - Emergency plan allowing to farm everywhere possible (setting aside nature 
plans and environmental requirements)  
Public-private - In the field of assuring sustainability: 
- Consistent implementation of sustainability at policy and business level 
- Less spoilage and more environmental friendly production 
- Link with sustainability and dietary changes, i.e. less and possibly other 
products on the shelf 
 - Assuring transport and electricity facilities 
 - Prevention of livestock epidemics 
 
- A Deltaplan in which all parties are involved, i.e. NL and EU-governments as 
well as sector organisations 
1Answers in questionnaire topics (ii), i.e. degree to which calamities threaten food supply continuity in Europe 
(“Risks”); and (iv), i.e. relevance of risk management strategies for assuring the company’s business continuity 
(“Risk management”). 
